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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GORDON L. WEIGHT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
-vs.- Case No. 
HARRY B. MILLER, and HARRY B. 10037 
MILLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Brief of Appellant 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action on a promissory note by Plain-
tiff Weight, as payee, to recover $1200., interest in 
the sum of $392.00 and attorney's fees of $348.33 and 
costs of $15.00 from Defendant Miller, the maker. 
Said note was executed by defendant on Jan-
uary 2, 1960 for $1200.00 which he received the 
previous September from plaintiff as part payment 
due in connection with an employment agreement 
entered into by the parties on October 1st, 1959. 
The note was due October 1, 1960, and the date 
of the note was changed, at plaintiff's request, from 
January 2, 1960 back to September 1, 1959, the month 
the $1200.00 was paid by plaintiff to defendant. 
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2 
By the terms of the October 1, 1959 agreement, 
plaintiff agreed t~ pay in a total of $5,000.00 to de-
fendant to buy into a going printing business. At 
that time it was owned and operated individually, 
by defendant. : · 
Inter alia, tlle agreement provided-that defend-
ant would incorporate this business, together with 
its assets, within one year. further, and in consid-
eration· of plaintiff putting up $5,000. that defendant 
would convey $5,000. worth of corporate stock to 
plaintiff, plus ari additional amount equal to 8% in-
terest from the time of his investment. 
However, plaintiff paid in. only $1200. and either 
couldn't, or wouldn't,- pay in·the additional $3800.00. 
Defendant honored· the terms of the agreement in-
cluding hiring· plaintiff at a stipulated salary through 
December 1959. On January 2, 1960 the plaintiff per-
suaded defenda.nt ~to _.prepare the pror.nissory note 
for $1200.00, referred to herein, and ,did not there-
after. return to work for the defendant. Instead, he 
was hired by another printing company. 
Defendant claims that the $1200. paid to him 
by plaintiff in September 19_59 was p~rt of the 
$5,000.00 which plaintiff was to invest. Further, ·that 
plaintiff defaulted the $1200.00 by failing to pay. the 
balance due of $3800., or, at most, was entitled only 
to $1200. worth of stock in defendant's corporation, 
per the provisions of the employment agreement. 
Plaintiff contends the $1200. note was in no wise 
related to the agreement between the parties _and 
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that he is.' entitled to his money, interest, costs and 
attorneys fees. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah 
f~urid for plaintiff and granted judgment to him f~r 
the $1200., plus $392. interest, attorney's fees of 
$34~.33 and $15. costs a9ainst Defendant.. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Harry B. Miller seeks a 'reversal of 
the. decision of the court in awarding. this money 
judgment; the Plaintiff Gordon L .Weight seeks to 
have sustained the decision· of the court in award-
ing him this judgment. 
. . . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the ·autumn of 1959 plaintiff approached 
defendant and told him that he had some ideas for 
making money in the printing business, namely .by 
going into the offset printing phase, (R 63, 64 & 65) 
further that' he·: could 'get $5,000. to invest in 'De-
fendant's ·busihess,. ptovided'·he w6uld hire plain-
tiff :·and give him a ·firiancial interest in the business. 
After several 'discussions (R 65) during which they 
agreed upon the general terms, the parties retained 
plaintiff's attorney, Ray Montgomery, to draw up 
the agreement, which was to become effective on 
!0ctober·1.· 1959~ · · · 
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After the initial discussions, and before the 
papers were signed, plaintiff paid defendant sums 
of $700. and $500., totalling $1200. Defendant used 
the first $700. as down payment on one of two print-
ing presses which were needed in the new offset 
prmting venture. By paying cash within 35 days on 
the one machine, the parties could save $700. (R 67). 
With assurances from plaintiff that he could get the 
balance due of $3800_ defendant purchased the 
printing press, but later had to borrow money to pay 
for it, at high interest rates, when plaintiff failed to 
pay the balance he had agreed. {R 69). 
The October 1, 1959 agreement executed by 
both parties: (Exhibit 2-d) had 8 provisions, 6 of 
which are material here. These provided (1) Agree-
ment would be for one year; (2) Both parties were to 
devote full time and attention to this business; (3) 
Plaintiff was guaranteed a salary based on the union 
pay scale, payable twice each month, and defendant 
was to bear any losses sustained in the business; 
(4) Plaintiff was to use his own auto, but was to be 
reimbursed for gas and oil and other business ex-
penses; (5) Plaintiff was to loan defendant $5,000. "to 
be used for the furtherance of the business and is 
to be secured by a personal note with" ... 8% in-
terest, and said "promissory note is hereby referred 
to and incorporated within this document as part 
of the agreement" . . . (6) Defendant agreed to in-
corporate the business within one year, repay 
plaintiff in the form of stock of the corporation and 
also give him an option to buy up to a total of 25% 
of all the corporate stock at par value, and to appoint 
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5 
plaintiff as a director when the corporation was 
formed. 
Plaintiff worked for defendant from October 1 
through December 31, 1959, and received the agreed 
salary and expenses (R 40, 52, 53 &58). Plaintiff never 
paid any more on his $5,000. committment, although 
defendant often reminded him of it (R 61, 71, 8l).Each 
received a copy of the written agreement. Attorney 
Montgomery had prepared a note, which was un-
dated, unsigned, and with the amount left in blank 
which plaintiff claims he gave to defendant, but 
which defendant denies ever seeing, (R 70). 
Finally, on January 2, 1960, after plaintiff continued 
to complain to defendant about not having any evi-
dence for his $1200. investment, defendant told 
plaintiff to go out and buy a note and that he, de-
fendant, would sign it. (R 72). This was done 
and defendant had the form note made out for $1200., 
with 8% annual interest, from October l, 1959; it 
provided for attorney's fee. When plaintiff noted 
that the note was dated January 2, 1960, he request-
ed defendant to date it back to September 1, 1959, 
in order to protect him on the 8% interest which he 
had coming, which defendant did. (Exhibit 1-P) 
(R 73). After receiving the executed note for 
$1200. from defendant on January 2, 1960, the plain-
tiff never reported for work again, although he did 
come back on January 18, for a $16. gas expense 
check, at which time he told both the defendant and 
the bookkeeper, Ruth Marks, that he was working 
for a competitor printing firm {R 54, 85, 86). 
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Defendant and Mrs. Marks each testified that 
Defendant did incorporate his printing business, 
The Lorraine Press, on September 30, 1960, prior to 
the end of the one year period provided for in the 
agreement (R 46). Too, the certified copy of 
the articles of incorporation indicate the meeting of 
incorporation was held on September 27, 1960, with 
said articles being received by the Secretary of 
Utah on September 30, 1960. (Exhibit No. 10-d). 
Further that Plaintiff's name, Gordon L. Weight was 
shown in Article VI. as -an incorporator, and in Ar-
ticle VII as a director, although the name was later 
drawn through and the name of Defendant Miller's 
attorney, Thomas P. Vuyk, was written in. 
Defendant testified that plaintiff worked well for 
the first two months after which time both defendant 
and the bookkeeper testified that plaintiff broke ap-
pointments with customers, never reported in to 
the office and otherwise indicated a loss of interest 
in his work (R 74, 76). Mr. Montgomery, the at-
torney friend of plaintiff, who drew the business 
agreement of October 1, 1959 testified that defendant 
telephoned him in December 1959 and reported that 
he was disappointed in the plaintiff's work at that 
time and that he might have to let him go. He like-
wise testified that he had a talk with plaintiff a week 
prior to this "at his own home." Plaintiff complained 
to Montgomery that he hadn't been taken into the 
management and executive part of the business, 
and that he was supposed to be, according to the 
agreement. (R. 99 & 100). However, the agreement 
(exhibit 2-d) does not provide anywhere for bringing 
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plaintiff into management or as an executive of the 
business. At this time Mr. Montgomery said he told 
the plaintiff that he hadn't better breach the contract 
by quitting, or he would be in default on the con-
tract, and the plaintiff told his lawyer that he would 
continue working. (R. 100). During the same period, 
December 1959, plaintiff claims that defendant told 
him that he was now on a 10% commission, effective 
immediately, because of his lack of production in 
the business (R 28). However, both defendant, 
and the then bookkeeper, Mrs. Marks, testified that 
he was paid his full salary through December 1959 
(R 40, 52, 88) and that he was the one who breached 
the agreement by quitting work with defendant and 
taking employment elsewhere. 
The defendant was not certain whether plain-
tiff was still working for him or not, until the plain-
tiff told him and Mrs. Marks, on January 18th, 1960, 
when he came for his gas expense check, that he 
had another job with Eric Seaich Company 
(R 41,54, 85) for whom he was employed for six or 
seven months thereafter. 
Defendant told plaintiff on one occasion when 
they met in the State Capitol Building, after de-
fendant had incorporated the business that he, the 
plail'!tiff, did have stock coming for the $1200., but 
that he would not make a cash settlement. (R 79). 
Neither party ever agreed that the $1200. note was 
to be paid for in cash and there is no evidence that 
the note was given as anything more than an in-
dication that plaintiff had $1200. of his $5,000. in-
vested into the business. (R 39). 
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POINTS URGED FOR REVERSING THE DE-
CISION OF THE LOWER COURT. 
POINT I. DEFENDANT SHOULD EITHER HAVE 
BEEN ENTITLEn TO RETAIN THE $1200. PAID IN 
UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT, OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO PAY 
PLAINTIFF IN THE STOCK OF THE 'CORPORA-
TION TO BE FORMED, AS SPE1CIFIED IN SAID 
AGREEMENT. 
Plaintiff admits that he paid in only $1200.00 
of the $5,000 agreed upon in the employment agree-
ment. Further, he admits that this $1200. paid in, 
in September 1959, was part of the sum of $5,000 
which he had agreed to pay in on the agreement. 
(R 17, 25, 39). Further, that the $1200. note which he 
persuaded defendant to sign on January 2, 1960 was 
for the $1200.00 he paid in as part of the employment 
agreement of September 30, 1959. (R 17, 25, 39). 
There was no evidence that there was a mutual 
agreement to terminate this employment contract. 
Defendant, before the end of the 12 month term 
of the employment agreement, did incorporate the 
Lorraine Press from the assets of the individual 
printing business which he owned, and as required 
by this agreement between defendant and plaintiff. 
(See certified copy of Articles of Incorporation -
exhibit 1 0-d). 
Although there were evidences of disharmony 
between the parties, concerning the employment 
and salary portion of the agreement, there was no 
demand by either party upon the other in this re-
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gard, although appellant stated he made numerous 
requests upon plaintiff for the balance due of 
$3800. on his investment in appellant's business. 
(R 67, 68, 71, 81, 82, 83, 84). 
Plaintiff's exhibit (exhibit 3-P), an undated: 
unsigned, and incompleted note, is relied upon by 
him to claim that, as evidence of the original intent 
of the parties when the employment agreement was 
drawn, it shows that he was entitled to money, not 
stock, for his $1200. because this unsigned docu-
ment so stated. However, upon close examination of 
this unsigned note, it is indicated that the language 
relied upon by respondent reads, "Should there be 
a default in the foregoing provisions," ... then the 
money, rather than the stock, is to be paid. The "fore-
qoing provision" referred to refers to the duty of the 
appellant to incorporate, obviously, and reads, 
"It is hereby agreed that the said ·-----------------------
dollars shall be paid in the form of stock of a cor-
poration from the assets of the Lorraine Press on or 
before the due date of the note or within a reason-
able length of time thereafter." 
If this exhibit 3-P is to be given any credence by 
the court, it should be accurately read and inter-
preted, and in conjunction with the employment 
agreement of September 30, 1959 which reads, in 
the last sentence of the Sixth paragraph therein: 
"The promissory note is hereby referred to and in-
corporated within this document as part of the agree-
ment between Harry B. Miller and Gordon L. 
WeighL" 
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This unsigned, , "Promissory Note", exhibit 3-P, 
and the Agreement exhibit 2-D, which incorporates 
it into and makes it a part of said Agreement, pro-
vides for the payment "in the form of stock of a cor-
poration". If there is a default in· this provision, i.e. 
if the corporation is not formed, "or should the 
parties mutually agree to terminate their agreement" 
which they did not do, then all of the money paid in 
would become due and payable. When read to-
gether, no other conclusion is tenable. in this action. 
Defendant testified that he had offered $1200. 
in stock, plus interest, to plaintiff, and alleged the 
same i~ his Answer (R 23, 79). 
Plaintiff testified that he never returned to 
work after January 2, 1960, which was the date he 
persuaded defendant to sign the $1200. note, al-
thought he never advised defendant that he was 
quitting, and never asked for nor received a termina-
tion slip; some two weeks later, when he went back 
for a gas expense check, plaintiff states he 
mentioned that he was going to work for Eric Seaich 
(another printer), although defendant and witness 
Ruth Marks testified that he stated he was then 
working for Seaich, which was the first they knew 
of his not working for Lorraine Press (R 41, 54, 85, 86). 
Plaintiff also testified that he was not paid 
for the last two weeks of December 1959, while em-
ployed by defendant; however defendant's book-
keeper testified from her records, and defendant 
likewise testified that plaintiff received salary 
checks, based on the employment agreement 
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through December 1959, as well as gas expense pay-
ments (R 40, 52, 53, 88). 
Defendant stated that he felt obligated to incor-
porate within the one year period, or it would have 
been necessary to refund the $1200. sum which 
plaintiff had paid in on his $5,000. committment. 
Unless incorporated, defendant states that he knew 
he would have been in default and would have had 
to repay plaintiff in money (R 77, 93). Both de-
fendant and Mrs. Marks testified that the incorpora-
tion papers were received by the Secretary of State 
of Utah on September 30, 1960 (R 46). 
Defendant testified that he wasn't happy with 
plaintiff's performance during December 1959, 
but that he wasn't so unhappy with him as to termi-
nate him (R 86, 87) and admitted talking with him 
about the salary he was receiving and which was 
considerably more than the salesman's commission 
he would have received on the business he had pro-
duced (R 87, 88, 89). Defendant must not have known, 
when he signed the $1200. note for plaintiff on 
January 2, 1960, that plaintiff had, as of that time, 
decided to quit his· job with defendant. Otherwise 
he would not have signed the note without ascertain-
ing that he might be binding himself for payment 
of money ,rather than stock. 
POINT II. DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE 
PENALIZED BY PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO 
TREAT THE PRINTED NOTE FOR $1200., AS HAV-
ING NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE EMPLOYMENT 
AGREEMENT AND BY HAVING THE LOWER 
COURT ALTER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT 
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FROM PAYMENT IN "STOCK" TO PAYMENT IN 
"MONEY". 
Utah's Rules of Civll Procedure, Rule 16, states, 
in part, such (pretrial) order when entered controls 
the subsequent course of the action, unless modified 
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." In the in-
stant case ,there was no modification of the pre-trial 
order, nor amendment of the pleadings. Instead, 
the lower court required several issues to be de-
veloped, which defendant was not prepared to meet, 
and which were completely foreign to the single 
pre-trial question. This was prejudicial error to de-
fendant. Subject to the qualification that the court 
may modify its order, the parties are bound by the 
pre-trial order. In support of this rule are Fowler vs. 
Crown-Zellerbach Corp. 163 F 2d 773 (CCA9th) and 
Fanciullo vs. G. B.G. & S. Theatre Corp. (Mass) 8 NE 
(2d) 174. 
The court's pre-trial terms may not be contra-
dicted, according to Ringling Bros. vs. Olvera 
(V CCA9th) 119 F2d 584, and Berry vs. Spokane RR 
Co. (Oreg) 6 FR Serv 16.32, Case l, and 2 FRD 483. 
Further, the court should not give instructions con-
trary nor inconsistent with its pre-trial order. Bryant 
vs. Phoenix Bridge Co. (Me) 43 F Supp 162 and E. 
W. Baker vs. Lagaly (CCA lOth) 144 F2d 344. Both 
parties are bound, equally, by the pre-trial order, 
Daitz Flying Corp. vs. U.S. (NY) 8 FR Serv 16.23, 
Case 1, 4 FRD 372. 
In the instant case there was no "manifest in· 
justice" to prevent. And, if the pre-trial order did not 
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properly reflect the contentions of the parties, it 
could have been set aside, before the trial, and a 
new conference ordered. No one contended the 
order was inadequate in this case. Authority for 
this is an Oregon case, Calvin vs. West Coast Power 
Co. 5 FR Serv 16.33, Case 1, 2 FRD 248. 
Defendant testified, and it was not rebutted, that 
by December 1959, plaintiff had mentioned that 
it didn't look as if the $5,000. investment was going 
through; further that he, plaintiff, did want some 
evidence that he had loaned $1200. to defendant, 
at which time defendant instructed him to make up 
a note, which was done. Defendant, at plaintiff's 
request at that time, also dated back the note to con-
fonn to the month, September 1959, which was the 
month plaintiff stated he had made the $1200. down 
payment on the $5,000. {R 72, 73). 
The actions of the plaintiff in obtaining the 
$1200. note on January 2, 1960, never returning to 
work thereafter, nor asking for a termination slip 
would indicate that he had then mentally resolved 
to leave the Lorraine Press. If he had not been quit-
ting defendant's employment, surely he would have 
asked for the last two weeks pay ,to which he was 
entitled, and which he claims he didn't get, as well 
as a termination slip, which would have enabled 
him to obtain unemployment benefits while seek-
ing other employment. 
Counsel for the plaintiff contended, at the trial 
that the $1200. note signed by defendant on Jan-
uary 2, 1960, and then dated back, at plaintiff's re-
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quest. to September 1, 1959, was a different 
promissory note from any note referred to in the 
contract, and therefore had nothing to do with the 
employment agreement of September 30, 1959. (R 8, 
9). Plaintiff also stated that he could not see what 
the employment agreement had to do with the $1200 . 
. promissory note (16). 
However, plaintiff testified that the executed 
note for $1200. was obtained to replace the note 
originally prepared by his counsel, and which was 
lost or misplaced before it was executed by appel-
lant '(R 10, 39, 65, 70). Plaintiff likewise stipulated 
that the date ·of January 2, 1960, on the $1200. note 
was chariged back to September l, 1959, and that the 
$1200. paid to defendant in September 1959, and evi-
denced by this note in the same amount, was part 
of the $5,000. which plaintiff agreed to pay de-
fendant, per the terms of the employment agreement 
(R 11, 12). 
Plaintiff further testified that there was no 
urgency in paying in the $5,000., which he agreed 
to pay. (R 13). However, he knew that defendant was 
goirig to use the money to buy a new press for 
$4,000. in furtherance of the business. (R 13, 14). 
When that portion of the employment agree-
ment was read to plaintiff which required de-
fendant to incorporate within a year, and to pay 
plaintiff in stock for monies invested, at 8% in-
terest, he indicated that he was thoroughly familiar 
with these terms, although he had no information 
as to whether the incorporation actually took place 
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(R 15, 17, 18). Further, in January 1960, during a 
discussion, plaintiff reminded defendant of their 
contract (R 28), indicating that he considered it in 
existence at that time. 
POINT III. THE LOWER. COURT ERRED IN 
DETERMINING MORE THAN THE ONE QUESTION 
AGREED UPON AT THE PRE-TRIAL, NAMELY, 
WHETHER THE $1200. NOTE WAS ANY PART OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. 
The Lower court erred in failing to grant de-
fendant's motion to dismiss the complaint o£ plain-
tiff's after testimony given by the plaintiff clearly 
show that the $1200. note was part of the employ-
ment agreement between the parties. (R 42). 
The court then erred further in determining 
whether the agreement had ever been mutually 
tenninated, in admitting a copy of the original note, 
in blank, which was never executed, and which was 
prepared by plaintiff's attorney at the time the 
agreement was prepared (R 33). 
Although the plaintiff testified that the 
$1200. note was part of the agreement, which was 
the only question to be determined, and at which 
point plaintiff's case should have been dis-
missed, the lower court still ruled th~t.the agreement 
had been "scrapped" and the note for $1200. was 
for monies had and received, and not repaid (R 102, 
103). 
Defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's action 
should have been granted after testimony given by 
the plaintiff indicated that the $1200. -note was defi-
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nitely part of and related to the employment agree-
ment entered into by the parties. Plaintiff stated a 
recoverable claim, but failed to prove it in the evi-
dence given by him at the trial. Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 41 (b); Rasmussen vs. Davis, 1 Utah 
(2d) 96; 262 P (2d) 488; Alvarado vs. Tucker, 2 Utah 
(2d) 16; 268 p (2d) 986. 
In this type of employment contract, where ad-
ditional consideration, other than services, moves 
from the employee to the employer, in the absence 
of terms of the contrary, such agreements may con-
tinue as long as the employee is able and will w 
do his work satisfactorily. This rule is recognized 
in an Indiana case, Pa. Co. vs. Dolan, 32 N.E. 802 
and in Skagerberg vs. Blandin Paper Co. (Minn.) 266 
N.W. 872. 
Other cases say this right continues as long as 
the employer is in business and needs the em-
ployee's services. In accord are Carnig vs. Carr, 
(Mass.) 46 N.E. 117 and Rape vs. Mobile & 0. R. Co. 
(Miss.) l 00 So. 585. 
If defendant had fired plaintiff, as claimed, the 
former had numerous rights of action against de-
fendant. Instead, plaintiff accepted other employ-
ment, for less money, he stated, (R 21) and without 
actually notifying defendant that he was quitting his 
job. When plaintiff learned that his investment 
would not enable him to start out as an executive, in 
the management of the business, and that he would 
have to work for his salary, he arbitrarily decided 
to quit. (R 36, 99, 100). 
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Defendant's position is that plaintiff breached 
the employment agreement when he failed to re-
turn to work in January 1960. Defendant went on and 
later incorporated, within the 12 month period re-
quired by his agreement with plaintiff. Defendant, 
in effect, waived the breach by the plaintiff and did 
not sue on said breach, neither for the balance of 
$3800. pledged, nor by plaintiff leaving his employ-
ment. Defendant was within his rights to keep the 
agreement in force and to later incorporate. Snow-
ball vs. Maney Bros. Co. (\Nyo.) 270 Pac. 167., Forbes 
vs. Appleyard, (Mass.) 63 N.E. 894 and In Re Hook 
(DC.) 25 F (2d) 498. Subscribing to this rule also is 
Page on Contracts, 2nd Edition, Sections 3038, 3042, 
and 3060. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the Court erred in 
giving a decision against defendant Miller and in 
favor of plaintiff Weight for $1200., plus $755.33 
attorneys fees, interest and costs. 
The testimony given several times by plaintiff 
Weight clearly shows that the $1200. promissory 
note, executed by defendant Miller, was without 
question, part of the employment agreement 
referred to, a copy of which was attached to the 
Answer, and the original of which was introduced 
as plaintiff's Exhibit 1-P. 
The pre-trial order stated that this was the only 
question for the Trial Court to determine; on the 
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basis of the plaintiff's own testimony in the 
Record, we submit that the Trial Court erred in hold-
ing that the note should have been paid in dollars, 
instead of in stock, as was provided for in the em-
ployment contract. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MERRILL K. DAVIS 
A ttdrley for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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